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of full creation itself—1^o, 2^o, 3^o. Without crucifixion—both in creative and creaturely realms—there could be no glorification.

If a doubt here arise as to the creature's triumph, finally, over the evils that beset and sting him during the developing throes of the second degree, let it be remembered that the Creative Germ inherent to the first degree, as the Eternal Word—"the Life that lighteth every man that cometh into the world"—is a quenchless power that never falters nor yields, however much it becomes inverted or obscured by the overlying human grossness—the darkness that *comprehendeth not*—during the processes of moulding and operating the creaturely life. Rank growth in the corn inverts and obscures the life of the seed-form. Crude materials and the toilsome labors of the artist invert and misrepresent the conception that flamed in his soul as a quenchless vision, and that finally transfigures that material into glorified form. Is the Creative Word less efficient to achieve its infinite designs in its creature than are corn-life and art-genius efficient to their ends? Shame on the thought that deems it possible. All of the visible and invisible powers are tributary to his ends. Natural and Spiritual worlds are both instrumental to his purposes, as natural day and night together serve to carry human powers forward in natural form and functions. Natural and Spiritual worlds are simply tributaries to the Divine Natural.

HUME AND KANT.¹

BY G. H. HOWISON.

I. Hume's question, *How are judgments concerning matters of fact possible by mere reason?* brings to view an element in the theory of knowledge that is neither to be evaded nor dispensed with. Real cognitions, as Hume penetratingly sees, are all dependent on the principle of causality: since, now, the latter is nowhere to be found within the entire range of experience, we come, no doubt, by the new insight that *experience is not an adequate*

¹ Outline of four lectures delivered at the Concord School of Philosophy, in July, 1883.

ground of real knowledge; but, as the principle in question seems by the same token to originate in the mere phantasy of reason, it appears to be invalidated, and from the empirical standpoint, which is, however, unavoidable, we come inevitably upon Hume's question, which must be answered without any evasion.

This question now, which by implication reads, Why are the judgments aforesaid not utterly impossible on the face of the matter? brings in its train A THREEFOLD DIFFICULTY. *First*, How is any absolute morality—any morality grounded in religion—possible? or, How is a knowledge of *transcendent* realities possible—how is a transit from the sensible to the supersensible possible in general? *Second*, How is even any system of rights possible; any system, that is, founded on justice? for if morality loses its foundation on absolute truth (which is possible only through knowledge of the transcendent), and consequently turns out, and law with it, to be merely the expression of feeling and habit, all authority comes down to mere force, and any such thing as patriotism seems therefore impossible. *Finally*, as by the dissolution of the principle of causality all knowledge of the future from the *past* is reduced to pure illusion, how is such knowledge possible at all?

II. To this threefold branching of the problem presented by Hume there is A COUNTERPART THREEFOLD IN KANT'S SYSTEM OF "CRITICISM." *First*, Kant aims to rescue absolute morality, and likewise the validity of a transit by thought from the sensible to the supersensible generally, by his doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason: it is only as *legislative*, he declares, that reason is actually universal—only thus does it reach the full realization of a rational nature; God, freedom, and immortality are not to be made out by theoretic *seeing* at all, but solely by that *a priori volition* which simultaneously posits duty as a categorical or absolutely unconditional imperative, and those transcendent existences as postulates without which this absolute law would fail of any fulfilment. *Next*, he aims to establish upon the same principle the authority and thoroughgoing justice of the political order; the State, he teaches, obtains a genuine right only by protecting the freedom of each individual so far as this comports with the freedom of every other under that imperative of reason which alone, as absolutely categorical and yet set up by the individual himself,

puts freedom and obedience alike on firm foundations. *Finally*, he seeks to explain and warrant the possibility of a predictive science of nature by his epoch-making theory of "transcendental idealism;" the science in question, he maintains, is only possible, though in this case is certainly possible, on condition that the objects to which it refers shall be, not things in themselves, but only *phenomena*—only the *appearances* of the things, as these are seen in the *a priori* forms of the percipient subject; in brief, nature is, as to its *form*, the creation of the mind—is transcendently ideal; as to its *matter*, however, in order to save perceptive cognition from being illusion, there is requisite an element in our cognitive faculty that is purely *sensuous*—*i. e.*, strictly susceptive of what is given out of the things in themselves; in other words, an element (or component) of mere *receptivity*.

III. But this theory of Kant's, whether in the one or the other of its main branches, fails of any thorough solution of the difficulties raised by Hume. *First*, the primacy of the practical reason is an *unarticulated* principle, tacitly *accepted*; in no case is it possible to save the practical reason at the expense of the theoretical; for if the existence of God is *theoretically* incognizable, every so-called postulate of the practical reason becomes a mere condition or requisite for the carrying out of an *impulse*—of a mere *drift*—whose warrant is utterly unknown and forever unknowable. *Secondly*, the famous "Categorical Imperative," as Kant deals with it, is not only an empty *formal* law, but is, besides, an unestablished *assumption*, quite in the manner of the Scottish philosophers so ridiculed by Kant himself; and, in the light of this fact, the entire ground for the passage to the supersensible by means of the practical falls away. *Finally*, the doctrine of the "transcendental," precisely because it does contain that foreign element of receptivity, is no solution of the enigma concerning the knowledge of the future; if a something wholly foreign to the percipient subject is necessary in order to any knowledge at all, it becomes forever impossible to predict what sort of course a world of sense is to have whose essence consists in the result of interaction between *a priori* forms and unknowable things; and, with this realized, the ground for the passage from the past to the future, even within the present world of sense, disappears.

IV. We need, then, a thorough reconstruction, enlargement,

and improvement of the Kantian procedure, if we are definitively to reduce the problems of Hume. By any theory whatever that persists in setting up the mere *immanency* of the human mind as an adequate conception of human nature, there is "No thoroughfare." Only by the conjunction of a real *transcendency* with the limitation that appears from the standpoint of experience to characterize our powers shall we ever come out into the open country of an unconditional knowledge, *even within the bounds of possible experience*; real knowledge of an order of *nature* even is conditional upon knowledge of transcendent realities; and the possibility of such knowledge must either be permanently surrendered, or else nature must be so conceived, and the conception justified, as to flow *wholly* from the same system of principles that gives form and reality to the percipient subject. In short, the Kantian rift in our nature *a priori*—the assumed chasm between pure intellect and pure sense, between *power* to *conceive* and mere *suscipiency* to *perceive*—must be closed up, or, rather, be proved non-existent, by being exposed as unintelligible and self-cancelling; our faculty of conscious being, the cognitive organism *a priori* that confers existence upon us, must be seen as wholly self-contained—as one and continuous from centre to circumference; space and time must be discovered to be strict categories as truly as causality—must be raised from so-called pure percepts into pure concepts, from mere forms of susceptibility into discharges (*Functionen*) of spontaneity; causality (into which all the Kantian categories are really subsumable) must be seen to *involve* space and time—to contain them ideally as the terms, founded in its own nature, of its own self-fulfilment; and sensibility must come to be understood as simply the last term in that process of particularization (or self-dispersion still always held in harmony by the originating unity), apart from the completion of which, intellection would fail of its own self-established idea—would fail, in short, of self-intelligibility, and therefore of intelligence.

The pathway, now, to the desired open country—to this over-spanning unity of understanding and sense, this *continuous* identity that shall embrace difference and conjoin form and matter, bare conception and clothing sensation, in one indivisible whole—lies through a new and more thoroughgoing critique of the pure categories, whereby it shall be shown that *all cognition is but the*

phenomenizing of the Unity subsisting in Kant's THREE IDEAS, and that the latter, as CAUSES PURELY SELF-DETERMINING, are actually CONSTITUTIVE of sensible objects, as well as of the human intelligence that perceives them. In short, the Three Ideas must be shown to form a veritable *system*—a self-organizing unity, originated and sustained by the self-activity of the Supreme Idea, the *Ens realissimum*, the absolute Self-completeness or Perfection ; this Supreme Idea, simply in fulfilment of its own ideal nature, perpetually manifesting itself in the other two, as percipient and perceived, subject and object, self and world. The one Supreme Idea will thus be seen to involve in its own ideal reality not only *immanence* in the intellection of particular subjects (percipients), but necessary *transcendence of it* ; and, as the very ideality of the Idea will thus consist in an incessant reaching out of its unity, to develop and enfold the infinite particularity in lack of which it would be meaningless void or pure nonentity, this identity that thus contains a forever assimilated difference must, in virtue of this true self-existence, this inherent transcendency, be acknowledged to be a *real* universal, unconditional and living, and thus to fulfil the infinitude of meaning that we are wont to designate by the sacred name of God. From this it would follow that all *pure* knowing—all knowing that succeeds in realizing its own nature—since it is real participation in a universal (*i. e.*, divine) consciousness, is a knowledge of the actual truth—of the truth, that is, as it must appear to any intelligent being whatever.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

TWO LAY SERMONS.

I. THE SOCIAL PHASE.

"As all the members, being many, are one body, so also is Christ."—1 COR. xii, 12.

SYNOPSIS.—I. Practical discrimination of the Social from the Individual Phase of Religion.—**II.** The Four Elements of the Social Phase, as so discriminated.—**III.** Review of the Mediatorial Office of Christ.—**IV.** Review of the Indivisibility of the Temple of God.—**V.** Review of "the more sure Word of Prophecy."—**VI.**